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This article is about passkeys. They let you log in to a shop without a password. You use a fingerprint, your face or the code that unlocks your phone. A passkey cannot be stolen like a password. We show how a shop can add passkeys. We also say what helps if your phone is lost. Ask us if you want help.

Passwords get stolen, forgotten, and guessed. Passkeys replace them with a key pair that the customer unlocks with a fingerprint, face, or device PIN. On Microsoft accounts, about 98% of passkey sign-ins succeed compared with about 32% for passwords (Microsoft), they are eight times faster than a password plus a second factor (Microsoft), and they are bound to the genuine domain. For online shops, the question in 2026 is no longer whether passkeys are coming but how to introduce them in the customer account without locking anyone out. Passkeys are also a building block of a Zero Trust strategy.

What Are Passkeys?

Passkeys are a sign-in method that replaces passwords with cryptographic key pairs. Instead of remembering a password, customers confirm the sign-in with the method they already use to unlock their device: fingerprint, facial recognition, or PIN.

The technology is based on the open standards FIDO2 from the FIDO Alliance and WebAuthn from the W3C. Level 3 of the Web Authentication specification has been a W3C Recommendation since August 25, 2026 (W3C). Apple, Google, and Microsoft support passkeys in their operating systems and browsers.

Phishing-resistant

Passkeys are bound to the domain and only work on the real website. Copycat sites therefore obtain no usable data.

Faster sign-in

Sign-in via fingerprint or facial recognition, averaging 8.5 seconds (FIDO Alliance).

No Passwords

Nothing to remember, nothing to forget, nothing to phish.

How Do Passkeys Work Technically?

Passkeys use asymmetric cryptography – the same principle that secures HTTPS:

  1. Registration: The device or password manager creates a key pair of private and public key for exactly this shop.
  2. Storage: The private key stays with the authenticator – on the device, on a security key, or encrypted in the customer's password manager. The shop only stores the public key.
  3. Sign-in: The shop sends a random challenge, and the device signs it with the private key once the customer approves.
  4. Verification: The shop checks the signature with the stored public key and signs the customer in.
No Secret Is Transmitted

Unlike with passwords, no shared secret is transmitted with passkeys. Anyone who steals a shop's database only finds public keys, which nobody can use to sign in.

Synced and Device-Bound Passkeys

The specification distinguishes two kinds: a passkey that may be backed up and transferred to other devices is commonly called a synced passkey; one that may not is bound to a single device (W3C). The authenticator reports which kind it is in two flags, stored in the record as backupEligible (may be backed up) and backupState (is backed up) (W3C).

In Google Password Manager, passkeys are synchronized and end-to-end encrypted (Google); at Apple, they are transferred to the customer's devices via iCloud Keychain (Apple). Device-bound passkeys are mainly those on security keys or stored locally with Windows Hello (Microsoft). For the shop, this means a lost smartphone with a synced passkey is usually not a customer service case, whereas a lost security key or Windows PC is.

State of 2026: How Widely Passkeys Are Actually Used

Availability is no longer the bottleneck. The nine companies in the FIDO Alliance Passkey Index report that on average 93% of their accounts are eligible for passkeys (FIDO Alliance). Only a little over a third, 36% of accounts, actually have a passkey enrolled, and more than a quarter, 26% of all sign-ins, use passkeys (FIDO Alliance) – at large providers after one to three years. In May 2025, nearly a million new passkeys were being registered on Microsoft accounts every day (Microsoft).

In Germany, the gap between awareness and use is similar. In the BSI's representative consumer survey, 38% knew the term passkeys, while 18% had used them (BSI). According to the Cybersicherheitsmonitor 2026, 21% of surveyed internet users aged 16 and over now sign in without a password, up from 16% the year before (Cybersicherheitsmonitor 2026). The BSI draws a conclusion from this for providers of online services:

Neben der kontinuierlichen Verbreitung von Passkeys sollten Anbieter von Online-Diensten und ‑Anwendungen daher insbesondere verstärkt die einfache Anwendung und die erhöhte Sicherheit dieses Verfahrens kommunizieren.

Our translation: In addition to the continued spread of passkeys, providers of online services and applications should therefore make a greater effort to communicate the ease of use and the increased security of this method.

BSI, Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2025 (German original)
What the Figures Mean for Planning

Anyone introducing passkeys will run two sign-in paths side by side for years; even at the Index companies, most accounts still have no passkey. Password sign-in, recovery, and customer service therefore have to stay secure for the long term, not just as a stopgap.

Benefits for Online Shops

Switching to passkeys brings measurable benefits for e-commerce operators. The figures describe large platforms, not the average shop:

MetricPassword LoginPasskey Login
Success rate on Microsoft accounts (Microsoft)about 32%about 98%
Success rate in the Passkey Index (FIDO Alliance)63% with other methods93%
Sign-in time (FIDO Alliance)31.2 seconds with other methods8.5 seconds
Phishing vulnerabilityHighLow, bound to the domain
Login-related support cases (FIDO Alliance)Baseline81% fewer
Account takeoversFrequent targetConsiderably harder
Shorter sign-in time

According to the Passkey Index, passkeys cut sign-in time by 73% to an average of 8.5 seconds (FIDO Alliance). Methods such as email verification, SMS codes, or social login took an average of 31.2 seconds (FIDO Alliance). Less friction at sign-in can mean fewer abandoned purchases.

Accessible Sign-In Under WCAG 2.2

Passkeys also help with accessibility. Success criterion 3.3.8 of WCAG 2.2 (Level AA) requires that no step of the sign-in process depends on a cognitive function test such as remembering a password, unless an alternative or a mechanism to assist is offered (W3C). A passkey is such an alternative. As mechanisms, the guideline lists password entry by password managers and copy and paste (W3C) – so neither should be blocked in the password field next to it. More on this in the article on the new success criteria in WCAG 2.2.

Security: Why Passkeys Prevent Phishing

Passkeys are phishing-resistant by design. This comes down to one simple mechanism:

Each passkey is bound to a specific domain (e.g., your-shop.example). If a customer is lured to a copycat site (e.g., your-sh0p.example), the browser does not even offer the passkey there. The browser performs the check, not the customer.

The pressure on passwords is rising: in 2024, Microsoft observed 7,000 password attacks per second, more than double the rate from 2023 (Microsoft). Passkeys remove the basis for phishing and for replaying stolen credentials – as long as no weak path remains open next to them. The weak point shifts to the password fallback and account recovery; how shops fend off waves of login attempts is covered in the article on account takeover and credential stuffing.

Implementation in Online Shops

Technically, passkey sign-in is an extension of the customer account: the browser provides the interface, while the shop creates challenges, verifies signatures, and manages the stored passkeys. We build custom solutions with PHP and JavaScript as part of our custom web development; the decision guide below shows which path fits.

Registration Step by Step

  1. Pick the moment: The customer is signed in, for example right after a password sign-in. A passkey is created for an existing account, not for an anonymous visitor.
  2. Create the options: The server generates a random challenge of at least 16 bytes (W3C), stores it until the ceremony is complete, and passes the shop's domain as the Relying Party identifier.
  3. User handle without personal data: The user handle must not contain personally identifying information such as a username or email address (W3C); a random string per account is sufficient.
  4. Ask the browser: navigator.credentials.create() opens the device dialog. The specification recommends a timeout of five to ten minutes, with five minutes as the default (W3C).
  5. Verify the response: The server checks the challenge, origin, and signature and creates the record.
  6. Notify: The customer receives an email about the new passkey – so a passkey added without their knowledge does not go unnoticed.
passkey-registration.js
// Passkey registration (simplified example)
async function registerPasskey() {
  const res = await fetch('/api/passkey/register-options');
  // Options arrive as JSON from the server and are converted into binary values
  const publicKey = PublicKeyCredential.parseCreationOptionsFromJSON(await res.json());

  const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({ publicKey });

  await fetch('/api/passkey/register', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify(credential.toJSON())
  });
}

Sign-In Through the Autofill Menu

Friction is lowest when the passkey is offered in the email or username field. The specification calls this conditional mediation: the shop calls navigator.credentials.get() with mediation: 'conditional', and the input field carries the webauthn token in its autocomplete attribute, for example username webauthn (W3C). When the customer clicks into the field, the browser shows their passkeys for this shop.

Whether the browser supports this is revealed by PublicKeyCredential.isConditionalMediationAvailable() (W3C); otherwise the “Sign in with a passkey” button remains. With the conditionalCreate capability, the shop can also have a passkey created without a prominent dialog after a password sign-in if the customer has already consented (W3C).

passkey-autofill.js
// Sign-in through the autofill menu (simplified example)
// HTML: <input name="email" autocomplete="username webauthn">
async function initPasskeyAutofill() {
  if (!window.PublicKeyCredential ||
      !(await PublicKeyCredential.isConditionalMediationAvailable())) {
    return; // the "Sign in with a passkey" button stays the way in
  }
  const res = await fetch('/api/passkey/login-options');
  const publicKey = PublicKeyCredential.parseRequestOptionsFromJSON(await res.json());

  const credential = await navigator.credentials.get({
    mediation: 'conditional',
    publicKey
  });

  await fetch('/api/passkey/login', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify(credential.toJSON())
  });
}

What the Shop Needs to Store

For each passkey, the shop creates a record on the customer account; one account can hold several passkeys. The specification lists the recommended items (W3C):

FieldContentImplementation note
Credential IDIdentifier of the passkeyup to 1023 bytes long (W3C); index it as unique
Public keyKey for verifying the signaturenot a secret, but protect it against replacement
Signature counter (signCount)last counter valuekeep updated; review a step back as a warning sign
Transports (transports)for example internal, USB, NFCstore unchanged, otherwise sign-in can fail (W3C)
backupEligible, backupStatemay be backed up, is backed upshows whether the passkey is synced
uvInitializedwhether user verification has been reportedonly count it as a factor from then on (W3C)
Own fieldslabel, created on, last usedso customers can recognize and delete their passkeys

If a customer deletes a passkey in the account, the entry remains in their password manager. While the customer is signed in, the shop passes the still valid credential IDs to the browser with PublicKeyCredential.signalAllAcceptedCredentials(); the specification prefers this path over signalUnknownCredential(), which reports an unknown ID during a later sign-in attempt (W3C). The password manager then removes or hides the orphaned entry (W3C).

Options for Shopware, WooCommerce and Custom Shops

  • Shopware: as a plugin for the customer account, sign-in page, and Store API. With a ready-made extension, first check how it handles recovery, several passkeys per account, and major version updates.
  • WooCommerce (WooCommerce agency): as a WordPress plugin for “My Account” and checkout – bound to the customer account, not only to access to the WordPress back end.
  • Headless and custom shops: a dedicated sign-in layer with WebAuthn in the front end and a server library in PHP or Node.js; the endpoints are secured like any other interface, see the article on securing the Store API.

Rollout Without Lockouts: Passkeys and Passwords in Parallel

The core question of every rollout is: how do as many customers as possible get a passkey without anyone losing access to their account? The answer is a phased plan in which the passkey is added and the existing path stays in place for now:

  • Offer passkeys as an option – in the account under sign-in and security, not as a requirement.
  • Invite after sign-in – after sign-in, Microsoft prompts users to create a passkey and, with this passwordless-preferred sign-in, reduced password use by over 20% in its own experiments (Microsoft).
  • Suggest the last method used – customers who have a passkey are offered it first; the password field stays reachable.
  • Keep password login – for older devices, shared computers, and customers who do not want to switch.
  • Remove the password only on request – for example for customers with at least two passkeys, not as a requirement.
Step-by-Step Migration

Measure three values at each stage: the share of active accounts with a passkey, the share of sign-ins by passkey, and the number of customer service requests about sign-in. Only when all three are stable is the next stage worthwhile.

Worked Example: What the Switch Can Do for Customer Service

An example with assumed values shows the order of magnitude. Suppose a shop receives 500 requests a month related to signing in – forgotten password, locked account, reset link not arriving – and needs 6 minutes per request. That is 3,000 minutes or 50 hours a month. For simplicity, we assume that customers with a passkey no longer file such requests and that all others file as many as before:

Share of customer accounts with a passkeySign-in requests per monthHandling time per monthSavings compared with today
0% (today)50050 hoursnone
10%45045 hours5 hours
25%37537.5 hours12.5 hours
36% (Passkey Index figure)32032 hours18 hours

The calculation is deliberately conservative. The companies in the Passkey Index report an 81% reduction in login-related help desk incidents (FIDO Alliance) – a figure from large platforms after one to three years, not transferable to a single shop. New requests after a device change or a lost security key have to be offset against this; a clear recovery path keeps them small.

Recovery and Account Takeover: When the Device Is Missing

Every case needs a way back that does not open a more convenient entrance for an attacker than the sign-in itself. The digital identity guidelines of the US standards institute NIST recommend encouraging users to maintain at least two separate means of authentication (NIST).

CaseWhat usually happensWhat the shop provides
Smartphone lost, passkey syncedThe customer signs in to their password manager on the new device and has the passkeys back.a help text explaining where the passkeys are stored
All devices lostRecovery with the password manager provider; at Apple with account, password, SMS confirmation, and device passcode, at most 10 attempts (Apple)the path via the confirmed email address as a fallback
Security key or Windows PC lostThe device-bound passkey is gone; a second passkey or the password helps.suggest a second passkey after registration
Customer without an accountThey order as a guest, no passkey needed.keep guest checkout open and offer the passkey later
Call to customer serviceThe caller asks for access to be unlocked.reset nothing over the phone, only trigger the documented recovery path

For the email path, the NIST guidelines provide useful reference values: an issued recovery code includes at least six decimal digits from an approved random bit generator (NIST) and is valid for at most 24 hours when sent by email (NIST). Every recovery triggers a notification to the customer so that misuse is noticed (NIST). The guidelines apply to US federal agencies; they still work as a benchmark for a shop.

Two cases deserve special attention. First, guest checkout: a passkey requires an account, an order does not – why a mandatory account is also problematic under data protection law is explained in the article on guest checkout instead of a mandatory account. Second, account takeover via recovery: whoever controls a customer's mailbox bypasses every passkey if the reset link signs in a new device without further checks. A waiting period, notifications via all stored channels, and blocked changes to payment data and delivery address in the days afterward largely close this gap.

Passkey sign-in at a shop is often confused with strong customer authentication under the Payment Services Directive PSD2. That obligation applies to the payment service provider: under Section 55 of the German Payment Services Supervision Act, it must require it when the payer accesses their payment account online, initiates an electronic payment transaction, or carries out an action through a remote channel that implies a risk of fraud (ZAG). Under Section 1(24) ZAG, authentication is strong if it uses at least two mutually independent elements from the categories knowledge, possession, and inherence (ZAG).

Signing in to a shop's customer account is not access to a payment account, and Section 55 ZAG addresses the payment service provider, not the merchant. Technically, a passkey with user verification combines possession (the device holding the key) with inherence or knowledge (fingerprint, face, or PIN); whether a payment service provider uses it for strong customer authentication is its own decision.

When it comes to data protection, the architecture helps. Biometric data such as facial images or fingerprint data (Article 4(14) GDPR), when processed for unique identification, belongs to the special categories whose processing Article 9(1) GDPR prohibits in principle (GDPR). With passkeys, such data does not reach the shop: recognition happens in the authenticator, and the shop only learns from a flag in the signed response that user verification took place (W3C). Credential ID, public key, and timestamps are still personal data because they are linked to the customer account; they belong in the record of processing activities and the deletion concept.

Not Legal Advice

This section classifies the legal situation from a technical perspective and is not legal advice; clarify further obligations of your shop with your legal counsel or data protection officer.

Browser and Device Compatibility

The table summarizes the vendors' information; what counts is the state of each vendor's documentation:

PlatformSupport according to the vendorStorage and syncSource and date
AndroidAndroid 9 or higher (Google)Google Password Manager; other providers selectable on Android 14 or higher (Google)Google, May 2025
iOS and iPadOSChrome on iOS and iPadOS 16 or higher (Google)iCloud Keychain or the Passwords app (Google)Google, May 2025
macOSChrome; iCloud Keychain on macOS 13.5 or higher (Google)Google Password Manager or iCloud Keychain, synced across Apple devices (Apple)Google, May 2025; Apple, September 2024
Windows 11Windows Hello saves the passkey locally on the device (Microsoft)alternatively in Microsoft Password Manager or another synced password manager (Microsoft)Microsoft, support page
Linux and ChromeOSChromeGoogle Password Manager (Google)Google, May 2025
Someone else’s deviceSign-in with the smartphone via QR code (Google)no passkey needed on the other deviceGoogle, May 2025

Anything the table does not list is tested before going live – at least Safari on the iPhone, Chrome on Android, and a desktop browser on Windows, plus the devices your customers use according to your web analytics.

Decision Guide: Which Path Fits Your Shop?

Which of the three paths fits depends less on the shop system than on four questions: How many domains share one customer account? Who is responsible for recovery? How often is the shop system updated? Does sign-in need its own rules, for example for business customers with several users?

CriterionReady-made extensionCustom extension in the shop systemDedicated sign-in layer
Fitsa shop with one domain and a standard accounta shop with its own account rules, for example in B2Bheadless front ends, several shops, or country domains
Recoveryas the extension provides itadapted to your own processesuniform across all channels
Multiple domainsdepends on the extensionfeasiblevia related origins
Updatesdepends on the extension vendorown maintenance for major versionsindependent of the shop system, but own maintenance
Effortlow to mediummediumhigher

For merchants with several country domains, the third row is decisive. A passkey initially only applies to the domain it was created for. With Related Origin Requests, the shop places a list of the associated origins under /.well-known/webauthn; browsers that support this must accept at least five different names in front of the domain ending (W3C). That way, one passkey works for shop.example and shop-at.example alike; without the list, the customer needs a separate one per domain.

Common Mistakes When Introducing Passkeys

  • Passkey as a requirement: Abolishing the password right away locks out customers with older devices or shared computers.
  • Email address as user handle: The identifier must not contain personally identifying information (W3C); a random string per account avoids this.
  • Subdomain as the shop identifier: Passkeys for www.shop.example no longer work after a move to shop.example. The main domain without www also covers its subdomains and is usually the more stable choice.
  • Not checking the challenge on the server: Tolerating a mismatched challenge compromises the security of the protocol (W3C).
  • Tested in only one browser: Dialogs and autofill look different depending on browser and operating system.

What You Can Tackle Now

In 2026, passkeys are available on the widely used platforms and standardized by the W3C. For a shop, a phased plan is advisable: offer, invite after sign-in, prepare recovery and customer service, measure the metrics. The password stays as long as customers need it.

We support you with passkey integration in your Shopware shop, your WooCommerce shop, or a custom solution through our tailor-made web development. Contact us for a consultation on introducing passkeys.

Sources and Studies

This article draws on Microsoft's announcement on passkey sign-ins (May 2025), the FIDO Alliance Passkey Index (October 2025), the W3C Web Authentication Level 3 specification (Recommendation of August 25, 2026) and WCAG 2.2, the BSI situation report 2025, the Cybersicherheitsmonitor 2026 by the BSI and the German police crime prevention program, the NIST guidelines SP 800-63B-4, vendor documentation from Google, Apple, and Microsoft, the German Payment Services Supervision Act (Sections 1 and 55 ZAG), and the General Data Protection Regulation (Art. 4 and 9 GDPR). The figures refer to the date of each publication.

With synced passkeys, usually not much: they are stored encrypted in the customer's password manager and are available again after signing in on the new device. If a passkey is bound to one device or a security key, a second passkey or the shop's recovery path helps, typically via the confirmed email address.

No. Passkeys also work on the desktop, for example with Windows Hello, with the browser's password manager, or with a security key via USB or NFC. A smartphone can additionally serve on someone else's computer via QR code.

Considerably better than passwords: the passkey is not offered on a copycat site, and a data breach at the shop only exposes public keys. Attacks shift to the password fallback and account recovery – these paths need the same protection.

Usually not. The obligation under Section 55 ZAG applies to the payment service provider, for example when a payment account is accessed online or a payment is initiated. Signing in to a shop's customer account is separate from that.

Not according to the specification. Fingerprint and face are checked on the device; the shop receives the public key and a flag indicating that user verification took place. Credential ID, key, and timestamps are still personal data and belong in the deletion concept.

That depends mainly on recovery and the number of domains. A ready-made extension for a shop with one domain is typically set up faster than a dedicated sign-in layer for several country domains or a headless front end. Add testing on your customers' devices and training for customer service.